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ABSTRACT
We devise cost sharing methods for connected facility loca-
tion games that are cross-monotonic, competitive and re-
cover a constant fraction of the optimal cost. The novelty
of this work is that we use randomized algorithms and that
we share the expected cost among the participating users.
We also provide a primal-dual cost sharing method for the
connected facility location game with opening costs.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complex-
ity]: General; G.0 [Mathematics of Computing]: Gen-
eral
General Terms
algorithms, design, theory
Keywords
cost sharing, mechanism design, connected facility location
1. INTRODUCTION
The problem of achieving truth-revealing or strategyproof
mechanisms for sharing the cost of deploying a network in-
frastructure has recently received a growing attention. In
this work, we are interested in designing cost sharing mech-
anisms that would encourage agents to cooperate to share
the cost of the network facility and to reveal their true val-
ues for receiving the service, i.e., group-strategyproof mecha-
nisms for which truthfulness is a dominant strategy for every
user or coalition of users.
We are given a set U of (potential) users. Each user j ∈ U
has a utility uj for receiving the service; if j is asked to pay
more than uj, he prefers to drop the oﬀer. For a subset
Q ⊆ U, let C(Q) denote the cost of servicing all users in
Q. A cost sharing mechanism determines (i) a set Q ⊆ U
of participating users that receive the service, and (ii) how
to distribute the servicing cost C(Q) among the users in Q
such that each user j ∈ Q is willing to pay his cost share, pj.
The beneﬁt of a user j is uj−pj if j ∈ Q, and zero otherwise.
We assume that each user is selﬁsh and hence may misreport
his utility so as to maximize his beneﬁt. A cost sharing
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mechanism is strategyproof if each user has no incentive to
misreport his utility; it is said to be group-strategyproof if
the same holds even if users collude.
Given a set Q of participating users, a cost sharing method
ξ computes a cost share ξj(Q) for each user j ∈ Q. A cost
sharing method is cross-monotonic if it satisﬁes
∀Q
′ ⊆ Q ⊆ U, ∀j ∈ Q
′, ξj(Q
′) ≥ ξj(Q).
Moulin and Shenker [5] proved that, given a cross-monoto-
nic cost sharing method ξ, one can devise a cost sharing
mechanism that is group-strategyproof.
We are interested in cost sharing methods that satisfy
competitiveness and approximate cost recovery. That is, (i)
the participating users in Q are charged at most the optimal
cost, C
∗(Q), i.e.,
P
j∈Q ξj(Q) ≤ C
∗(Q), and (ii) at least a
constant fraction 1/λ of the cost C(Q) of the constructed
solution is recovered, i.e.,
P
j∈Q ξj(Q) ≥ C(Q)/λ. We call
such a method a λ-approximate cost sharing method.
We devise approximate cross-monotonic cost sharing meth-
ods for connected facility location games (CFL). We are
given an undirected graph G = (V,E) with non-negative
edge costs ce, a set F ⊆ V of facilities with opening cost fi
for each facility i ∈ F, a set U ⊆ V of users and a parameter
M > 1. The goal is to open a subset F ⊆ F of facilities, to
connect each user j ∈ U to the closest open facility i(j) ∈ F
and to build a Steiner tree T connecting all open facilities
in F. The objective is to minimize
X
i∈F
fi +
X
j∈U
c(j,i(j)) + M · c(T),
where c(·,·) is the shortest path distance with respect to c,
and c(T) is the cost of the edges in the Steiner tree T. We
assume without loss of generality that a root node r ∈ F,
which is open in some optimal solution, is known in advance.
In rent-or-buy network design problems an edge e can
either be bought at cost M ·ce, or rented at cost ce; a bought
edge can be used by an arbitrary number of paths, while a
rented edge e costs ce for each path that uses it. The single-
source rent-or-buy problem (SSRB) is a special case of CFL,
where a facility can be opened at any node and all opening
costs are zero, i.e., F = V and fi = 0 for each i ∈ F.
2. RELATED WORK
Moulin and Shenker [5] developed cross-monotonic cost
sharing methods if the optimal cost function is a submodular
function of the set U. However, this is not the case forseveral network design problems such as Steiner tree, facility
location or rent-or-buy network design. Jain and Vazirani
[4] presented a cross-monotonic cost sharing method for the
minimum spanning tree game and therefore a 2-approximate
cost sharing method for the Steiner tree game. Devanur,
Mihail and Vazirani [1] proposed strategyproof mechanisms
for vertex cover and facility location games based on primal-
dual algorithms. However, their algorithms are not group-
strategyproof. Very recently, P´ al and Tardos [6] proposed
cross-monotonic cost sharing methods for facility location
and SSRB. They present a 3-approximate cost sharing meth-
od for facility location and a 15-approximate cost sharing
method for SSRB.
3. SINGLE-SOURCE RENT-OR-BUY
Our method is based on the randomized algorithm pro-
posed by Gupta, Kumar and Roughgarden [2], leading to
a randomized (2+ρST)-approximation algorithm for SSRB,
where ρST denotes the approximation ratio of the Steiner
tree algorithm used in Step 2 below. For a given set Q ⊆ U
of users, the algorithm works as follows:
1. Mark each user j ∈ Q with probability 1/M. Let Q
′ ⊆
Q denote the set of marked users.
2. Construct a ρST-approximate Steiner tree T on F =
Q
′ ∪ {r}.
3. Connect each user j / ∈ Q
′ to its closest facility in F.
In the following we outline how this algorithm can be
turned into an approximate cross-monotonic cost sharing
method.
Jain and Vazirani [4] gave a 2-approximate cross-mono-
tonic cost sharing method, ξ
ST, for the Steiner tree game,
which we use in Step 2. We deﬁne a random cost share
αj(Q) for each j ∈ Q as follows.
αj(Q) :=
(
M · ξ
ST
j (F) if j ∈ F, and
c(j,F) oterwise.
Here, c(j,F) denotes the shortest path distance from j to a
facility in F. Note that both ξ
ST
j (F) and c(j,F) are random
variables.
Theorem 1. The cost sharing method ξ, which for each
Q ⊆ U, j ∈ Q is deﬁned as ξj(Q) :=
1
4E[αj(Q)], is cross-
monotonic, competitive and with high probability recovers at
least a
1
4(1+ ε)
−1-fraction of the cost of the constructed so-
lution, for any constant ε > 0.
Unfortunately, to compute the expected cost shares in
polynomial time, one needs to derandomize the algorithm
of Gupta et al. Besides some eﬀort, we were not able to do
so. However, we believe that the idea of sharing the expected
cost will lead to attractive approximation ratios for cost
sharing methods in the future. A similar approach has also
been used in a recent independent work of Gupta, Srinivasan
and Tardos [3] to obtain a polynomial time 4.5-approximate
cross-monotonic cost sharing method for SSRB.
4. CONNECTED FACILITY LOCATION
In a recent work P´ al and Tardos [6] gave a 15-approximate
cross-monotonic cost sharing method for SSRB. Their idea
was to consider two processes: The cost shares are deter-
mined by a “ghost process”, which is designed such that the
cost shares are trivially cross-monotonic, and the actual so-
lution is constructed by a “real process”. We extend their
result to CFL. Most of the details of the two processes are
very similar to those given in [6]. For CFL, however, we ad-
ditionally need to deﬁne a cost share that accounts for the
opening costs of the facilities and decide which facilities are
eventually opened.
Ghost Process. We make the simplifying assumption that
the edges of G consist of a continuum of points, which we
call locations. We associate a notion of time with this pro-
cess. For each user j, we grow a ghost ball uniformly around
j as time progresses. If M or more balls intersect a location
p, we open p. At any time t, all open locations form a set
C(t) of connected components. The evolution of C(t) mimics
the standard primal-dual algorithm for Steiner trees, except
that new components may appear over time. As in [6], we
use this process to deﬁne two cost shares: αj(Q), which ac-
counts for j’s contribution towards building the Steiner tree,
and α
′
j(Q), which accounts for j’s connection cost. Addi-
tionally, we deﬁne a third cost share, α
′′
j , accounting for the
opening costs. At time t, j contributes max(0,t − c(j,i))
to the opening cost of a facility i. If the total contribution
towards i equals the opening cost fi, we open i. Let ti be
the time when i is opened, and let Qi be the set of users
that contribute to the opening of i at time ti. We deﬁne
α
′′
j (Q) := min(mini:j∈Qi ti,mini:j ∈Qi c(j,i)).
Real Process. We run the ghost process but open a loca-
tion p at time tp only if there is no other open location q
with c(p,q) ≤ 2tp. We use the same rule for opening facil-
ities. All locations that are opened are called centers. For
each center p we determine a facility, i(p), which is open and
closest to p. We assign all users in the cluster around p to fa-
cility i(p). Users that are not contained in any open cluster
are assigned to the facility of their closest center. Finally,
to make sure that open facilities are connected, we build a
Steiner tree on the centers and, for each center p, buy the
shortest path from p to i(p).
Theorem 2. The cost sharing method ξ, which for each
Q ⊆ U, j ∈ Q is deﬁned as ξj(Q) :=
1
5αj(Q) +
3
10α
′
j(Q) +
3
10α
′′
j (Q), is cross-monotonic, competitive and recovers at
least a
1
30-fraction of the cost of the constructed solution.
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